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21 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
thirty-year provision, if valid, operating merely to postpone the
enjoyment.
Possibly the theory of those opposed to the result reached in
the principal case was based upon a ratio decidendi such as appears
in the New York case5 where the court said of a limitation to
trustees to divide and pay at a future time, that there was no vesting
until that time arrived. But this rule would seem plainly inap-
plicable where, as here, the limitation is to children by name6 and
where the postponement of distribution is only for the convenience
of the fund or property and not for reasons personal to those
who are to take.
7
ELMER M. LEESMAN.
SALES-SUBSTITUTION OF ONE CARGO CARRYING VESSEL FOR
ANOTHER.-[Federal] In Matthew Smith Tea, etc., Co. v. Lam-
born' the same question is raised which was considered in a comment
in a recent number of this REVIEW. 2 In a contract calling for the
sale of a certain quantity of sugar and for its shipment from Java
within a specified time by steamer to Philadelphia, is the seller who
has designated a given steamer, which thereafter meets with an
accident, at liberty then to designate another steamer which was
loaded at the same time with the same sort of sugar, and if he is, is
the designation bad if it names a steamer not originally meant for
Philadelphia but destined for New York when it sailed from Java?
The case previously commented on3 allowed such a redesignation,
but held that the steamer originally bound for New York was not
a proper one for such a redesignation. The comment referred to
disagreed on both points, holding that no new designation should be
allowed, but that if it were allowed, then a proper substitute had
been chosen. The instant case deals almost solely with the latter
point, and it is interesting to note that in an opinion by Hough, C.J.,
it reaches a conclusion entirely opposed to the earlier case and fully
along the lines taken in the comment.
E. W. PUTTKAMMER.
WILLS-DIVORCE AS AN IMPLIED REvocATIN.--[Michigan]
The deceased married the proponent of the will in 1912 and in 1918
executed the will in question, by which she was made sole bene-
ficiary. In 1921 at the wife's suit a decree of divorce was granted.
The husband made no defense, there was no property settlement and
no alimony was granted or asked. The testator took no action
regarding his will, and died in 1923. Probate was contested on the
ground that the divorce constituted such a change in the testator's
5. Clark v. Clark 23 Misc. 281.
6. People v. Allen 313 111. 157, 158.
7. People v. Allen 313 I1. 159; McComb v. Morford 283 Ii. 589;
Thomas v. Thomas 247 II. 546.
1. 10 F. (2d) 697.
2. March, 1925, at p. 570.
3. National Bank of Commerce v. Lamborn (1924) 2 F. (2d) 23.
